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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Why should countries buy expensive catastrophe 
insurance? Abstracting from risk aversion or hedging 
motives, this paper shows that catastrophe insurance 
may have a catalytic role on external finance. Such effect 
is particularly strong in those middle-income countries 
that face financial constraints when hit by a shock or in 
This paper—a product of the Brazil Country Management Unit and the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin American 
and the Caribbean Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand how developing countries can deal 
with natural disasters more effectively. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The authors may be contacted at tcordella@worldbank.org, and ely@utdt.edu. 
its anticipation. Insurance makes defaults less appealing, 
relaxes countries’ borrowing constraint, increases their 
creditworthiness, and enhances their access to capital 
markets. Catastrophe lending facilities providing “cheap” 
reconstruction funds in the aftermath of a natural disaster 
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All countries are exposed and vulnerable to natural disasters.1 Exposure is mostly determined by geographic
characteristics, vulnerability by policies, and depends on levels of economic development. Indeed, richer
countries have more resources to ￿nance risk mitigation activities in preparation for, or reconstruction
activities in the aftermath of, a shock. This may well explain why the cost of the recent terrible earthquake
(both in terms of human lives and economic costs) was much larger in Haiti than in Chile and this despite
the fact that the latter earthquake was stronger.
If countries di⁄er in their exposure and vulnerability to natural disasters, should they deal with them
di⁄erently? What are the pros and cons of purchasing catastrophe insurance versus doing nothing and/or
relying on ex-post lending facilities such as the ones o⁄ered by international ￿nancial institutions? To answer
these important questions, this paper presents a simple model that sheds some new light on the main trade-
o⁄s that countries face in making such di¢ cult choices.
It is well known2 that market insurance, if reasonably priced, is the most e⁄ective way for risk adverse
agents to cope with large and rare events. This is true for individuals as well as for sovereigns. Indeed,
there are a few recent examples of countries that insured themselves against natural catastrophes:3 In May
2006, the Mexican government issued a US 160 million dollar parametric catastrophe bond to ￿nance rescue
and rebuilding in the case a major earthquake hits some densely populated areas of the country;4 in 2007,
a pool of Caribbean countries developed a Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRICF) that
facilitates their access to the insurance market. However, catastrophe insurance is expensive and even in the
most successful cases, such as the two we just discussed, the cost of coverage turned out to be a multiple of
the fair price (around three times in either case).5
Why is insurance so costly? Several reasons are invoked, including supply-side constraints induced by
either agency costs or adverse selection, problems of information opacity of tail events, coordination failures,6
and oligopolistic practices. While the securitization7 of catastrophic risk through the issuance of catastrophe
bonds may in the future induce greater market discipline, until now it has fallen short of reducing the costs
of insurance to actuarially fair levels.8
If insurance is so expensive, why do countries still buy it? One reason could be risk aversion; another
could be the presence of concavities in the production function and/or convexities in the borrowing cost
function that create hedging opportunities as in Froot et al. (1993). While both these assumptions may play
an important role for the demand of insurance, nonetheless we think that they only partially justify why a
1By exposure we denote the probability of being hit by a natural disaster and by vulnerabilty the expected loss associated
with any of such disasters.
2See Elrich and Becker (1972).
3See Hofman and Bruko⁄ (2006) for a survey of the insurance opportunities available to developing countries against natural
disasters.
4This was the the ￿rst tranch of a 450 milion US dollars insurage coverge plan. Payment are triggered if a earthquake of
magnitude 7.5 or 8 hits some prede￿ned zones of the country. See Nell and Richter (2004) for a discussion of the of parametric
insurance, that is of insurance policies with payments linked to measurable events such as the magnitude of an earthquake, or
the wind-speed of an hurricane.
5Note that a loading equal to two to three times the fair price is considerably lower than industry averages that range from
5 to 6 times expected outlays.
6See Ibragimov et al. (2008)
7For a comprehensive discussion of the market for catastrophe risk, see Froot (2001).
8For a discussion of the securitization of catastrophe risk and the development of a catastrophe bond market, see Doherty
(1997).
1country may decide to rely on expensive insurance. Indeed, risk aversion does not necessarily transfer from
individuals to countries and the production smoothing argument may not be always a critical one in dealing
with fat tails events such as natural disasters.
For the above reasons, in our model we assume that (i) agents are risk neutral, to abstract from consump-
tion smoothing motives, and (ii) that the premium requested to insure the stock of infrastructure against a
natural disaster is higher than the expected return of rebuilding the same infrastructure, to rule out hedging
motives. In such a setting, demand for insurance arises because of its ￿catalytic￿role on external ￿nance.
By this we mean that by guaranteeing resources that limit economic contraction in the aftermath of a shock,
insurance makes default relatively less appealing. This relaxes a country￿ s borrowing constraint, increases
its creditworthiness, and enhances its access to capital markets. For large rare events such as the ones we
consider here, such a benign e⁄ect may well outweigh cost considerations.
Of course, not all countries bene￿t the same from catastrophe insurance. The ones that bene￿t the
most are those medium-income countries that have limited access to the international capital market and
face ￿nancial constraints either when they are hit by a shock or in its anticipation. Conversely, catastrophe
insurance should not appeal to either poor countries without access to capital markets, that cannot pro￿t
from such catalytic e⁄ect, or to rich countries that preserve market access even in the aftermath of a large
disaster and thus have no reason to rely on expensive insurance.
Even in those cases in which it is bene￿cial for a country, one may nonetheless wonder whether insurance
is an e⁄ective choice for low-income catastrophe-prone economies that are likely to receive (belated but
cheap) o¢ cial loans in the aftermath of a catastrophe. To explore whether such donors￿Samaritan dilemma
may hinder the demand for insurance, we introduce a multilateral catastrophe lending facility guaranteeing
access to reconstruction funds at the risk-free interest rate in the event of a natural disaster. Unlike private
lenders, multilateral lenders are assumed to enjoy a preferred creditor status that allows to ￿ignoring￿credit
risk.9
The introduction of the facility weakens but does not eliminate the demand for insurance because of
the catalytic e⁄ect we just mentioned. While insurance entails a positive transfer after the shock (hence, its
catalytic e⁄ect), the repayment of the multilateral loan tightens the borrowing constraint, crowds out private
lending, and reduce the country￿ s investment opportunities in good times. This in turns implies that the
more credit constrained a country is, the greater the drawback of the lending facility relative to catastrophe
insurance, and the larger the demand for the latter.10
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the benchmark case.
Section 3 introduces and discusses catastrophe insurance. Section 4 does the same for the multilateral
catastrophe lending facility. Finally, Section 5 discusses the ￿ndings from a welfare perspective and Section
6 concludes.
9As documented by Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2003) for the IMF, multilateral lending to middle income countries is virtually
default risk-free. However, for our purposes it is su¢ cient to assume that the associated default costs are higher than for private
claims.
10To our knowledge, these issues have not been yet examined in the economic literature. By contrast, there is growing
economic literature assessing the economic costs of natural disasters. See, inter alia, Mauro (2006), Ramcharan (2005), Toya
and Skidmore (2006).
22 The model
Consider an economy endowed with a two-factor Leontief technology:
Q = ￿minfminf1;Lg;Kg (1)
to produce a single consumption good. The ￿rst factor, denoted by L, can be thought of as infrastructure,
which we assume to be at its maximal level L = 1 at the beginning of the production cycle (t = 0). The
second factor, K, represents installed productive units (or capital, for short), which we assume to be zero
at t = 0, and needs to be externally ￿nanced (see below). ￿ (￿ > 1) denotes a total factor productivity
parameter.
The timing of the model is as follows:
At time t = 0, the country issues bonds for an amount D0 to ￿nance capital investment K = D0. The
gross borrowing cost i is assumed to be equal to the risk free rate rf (which we normalize to 1 without loss of
generality) plus a risk premium ￿; itself a function of the probability that the country defaults on the bond
We thus have that i = 1 + ￿.
In the interim period,11 t = 1, with a probability ￿￿ which we assume to be ￿small enough￿throughout
the paper￿ the country is hit by a natural disaster that destroys a fraction ￿ > 0 of its infrastructure. Faced
with such a negative shock, the country has the option to issue new bonds for an amount D1 to ￿nance
infrastructure reconstruction, so that L = 1 ￿ ￿ + D1.
At the end of the production cycle, t = 2 output is realized and consumption takes place.
Denoting by the subscript b and g ￿bad￿and ￿good￿states of nature, according to whether the shock
occurs or not, output X in period 2 can be written as:
Xg = x + Qg = x + ￿minf1;D0g, (2)
Xb = x + Qb = x + ￿minf1 ￿ ￿ + D1;D0g; (3)
where x, x 2 <+, denotes period 2 endowment which we take as a proxy for the country￿ s income level.
The country￿ s ability to raise new funds D1; after su⁄ering the adverse shock, depends on its access to
capital market, which depends on its creditworthiness and thus on its perceived willingness to repay its
debt obligations. Speci￿cally, following the ￿old￿sovereign debt literature ￿ la Cohen and Sachs (1986), we
assume that a default causes the country to lose a share ￿ < 1 of its current output X, a loss that is not
fully appropriated by the lenders. For simplicity, and without great loss of generality, we then assume that
no part of this lost income accrues to the latter.
The country thus faces two distinct borrowing constraints depending on whether default is avoided
altogether, or it is expected only in the event of an adverse shock. In the ￿rst case, the constraint requires
that default costs, in bad states, exceed the cost of servicing the debt, or:
D0 + D1 ￿ ￿Xb = ￿ (x + ￿minf1 ￿ ￿ + D1;D0g): (4)
11For the sake of simplicity, and without great loss of generality, we assume that the interim period is close enough to the
initial period so that the borrowing costs are the same in both periods.
3Of course, if the country does not default in bad states it would a fortiori not default in good ones. In the
second case, instead, (4) does not hold, lenders anticipate default in bad states and charge a risk-adjusted
interest rate i = 1




￿ ￿ (x + ￿minf1;D0g): (5)







where the ￿rst inequality implies that investment increases default costs by less than it increases debt so
that a country without endowment has no access to ￿nance. The second inequality, instead, ensures that
investing in period 0 is always optimal.
In our model, consumers are risk neutral, and policy makers maximize expected income Y ,




where superscript j 2 fd;ndg denotes whether the country defaults if hit by an adverse shock or it does not,
and
Y nd
g = Xg ￿ D0; (8)
Y nd
b = Xb ￿ D0 ￿ D1;
Y d





b = (1 ￿ ￿)Xb:
Note that in this set-up, income and welfare are mostly determined by the borrowing constraints, and
the latter are, in turn, a function of endowment x. This implies that they are more likely to bind in poor
countries than in richer ones. In fact, given that default costs are proportional to total income, which, in
turn, depends on endowments, the latter plays the role of ￿implicit￿collateral to the bond issuance: richer
countries have more to lose if default is the avenue of choice.
We exploit this dimension in the characterization of the general solution of the ￿benchmark case￿by
distinguishing ￿ve intervals according to the value of the country￿ s endowment x. In the main text, we will
provide an intuitive characterization of our main results and we refer the reader to the Appendix for the
complete analytical treatment.
2.1 Benchmark Scenario




default costs are large enough to ensure that the borrowing constraint
(4) is never binding. As a result, the country can borrow at the risk-free rate the optimal amount D0 = 1
in period 0, and the optimal amount D1 = ￿ in period 1, if it is hit by a shock. Production is always
maximized, and so is expected income.
In less rich countries (xB
2 < x < xB
1 ), endowment no longer provides enough ￿collateral￿to ensure that
12The exact values of the thresholds are provided in the Appendix.
4borrowing constraints are always slack. As a result, the country cannot borrow D0 = 1 in period 0 and
D1 = ￿ in the event of a shock. In this case, policy makers have a choice between maximizing period 0
investment or ￿underinvesting￿initially, that is choosing a D0 < 1 in order to ￿save￿additional access to
￿nance should an adverse shock occur in period 1. We can show that, if the shock is rare enough￿ so that
the underinvesting ￿self insurance￿option is extremely expensive in terms of lost consumption￿ the country
always chooses to maximize period 0 investment at the expense of period 1 additional access to ￿nance in
the event of an (unlikely) adverse shock. We thus have that D0 = 1, D1 < 1 ￿ ￿:
If income further decreases (x < xB
2 ), the borrowing constraint now prevents the country from ￿nancing
the optimal amount of capital in period 0 and avoiding default in bad states. As before, for rare shocks, the
country chooses to maximize borrowing in period 0 at the expenses of borrowing after a shock in period 1,
so that we have D0 ￿ 1, D1 = 0. The relevant borrowing constraint (4) now becomes
D0 ￿ Dnd
0 ￿ ￿(x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) < 1; (10)
where the superscript nd denotes non default in the bad state. Note, however, that the ￿nancially constrained
country now has the option to increase its indebtedness up to the level that ensures repayment in good (but
not in bad) states. Speci￿cally, it can borrow up to (5), which now becomes:










where the superscript d denotes default in the good state. It can be shown that for su¢ ciently high en-
dowment values (xB
3 ￿ x < xB
2 ) total income is maximized by the lower (default-free) level of indebtedness,
whereas for lower values of endowment (xB
3 > x ￿ xB
4 ) the country chooses the higher level of indebtedness,
borrowing and investing Dd
0 in period 0, and defaulting whenever it is hit by a shock.
Finally, poor countries (x < xB
4 ) choose, again, to restrain their borrowing in period 0 so as to avoid
default if hit by a shock in period 1.
The above analysis is summarized in Figure 1.a, where we plot D0 and D1 as a function of initial income
x, setting the rest of the intervening parameters at reasonable (albeit arbitrary) values.13 Intuitively, for
rich countries (x ￿ xB
1 ) creditworthiness is never a problem: endowments provide enough implicit collateral
to ensure access to ￿nance to exploit investment opportunities in good states, and to fully rebuild the
infrastructure in bad states.
By contrast, all other countries face a trade-o⁄between the amount they can invest in period 0 and what
they can invest in period 1 if they are hit by a shock. For rare events, countries are better o⁄ investing more
in period 0, even if this means losing access to ￿nance in the (unlikely) event of a shock in period 1. In this
context, relatively rich upper middle-income countries (x ￿ xB
2 ) can still (partially) ￿nance the rebuilding
of infrastructure in period 1. This option is lost to when x < xB
2 .
Moreover, because for x < xB
2 countries are forced to underinvest in period 0 in order to avoid default
13In particular, we assume that ￿ = 0:02;￿ = 0:3;￿ = 1:25; and ￿ = 0:4.
5in period 1, they face the choice between borrowing more today and defaulting tomorrow in the event of a
shock, and borrowing less today and avoiding default costs tomorrow; a decision that ultimately depends on
the extent to which investment can be expanded by accepting the higher risk-adjusted interest rate.
In the case of middle-income countries with good access to capital (xB
3 ￿ x < xB
2 ), the additional
resources do not justify the higher rate, and default is avoided. These resources becomes relatively more
valuable as endowments decline and the ￿nancing gap widens so that, for lower middle-income countries
(xB
3 > x ￿ xB
4 ), overborrowing is the preferred strategy. However, because of the higher interest rate









which, in turn, explains why low-income countries (x < xB
4 ) prefer to limit investment to avoid default.
3 Insurance
The presence of borrowing constraints￿ that limit initial investment, the post-shock rebuilding e⁄ort, or both￿
create e¢ ciency losses in all but the richest countries. The natural arrangement to mitigate the problem is
an insurance contract that, in exchange of a premium, pays o⁄ the country in bad states. To discuss the
e⁄ect of the availability of such an insurance policy, we assume that in period 0 the country has the option
to purchase an insurance contract that pays o⁄ an amount Z in the interim period in case the country is
hit by a negative shock. To buy one unit of insurance, the country pays a premium ’ = ￿￿. ￿ is the net
present value of a unit expected insurance outlay, and ￿ is a margin that re￿ ects, inter alia, intermediation
costs and a risk premium (alternatively, the insurer￿ s cost of capital, including potential increases if the event
materializes). We assume that the insurance premium is paid up front and ￿nanced through debt issuance.





1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
; (13)
a non-empty interval for small enough ￿ (￿ < ￿), to explicitly model the fact that insurance is expensive14





which guarantees that no default occurs in the insurance case.15
The expected income of a country that in period 0 borrows D0+ ’Z to invest K0 and to purchase Z
units of insurance is
E(Y ) = x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)K0 + ￿￿minfK0;(1 ￿ ￿) + Z + D1g ￿ (K0 + ’Z + ￿D1): (14)
With this new instrument available, we revisit the country￿ s choices as a function of income levels. In the
case of rich countries (x ￿ xB
1 ) no insurance is needed to attain the optimum (the borrowing constraint is
14This stylyied contract applies more directly to the case of a parameterized CAT bond with principal Z and coupon ’,
which, in the case of a veri￿able natural disaster, virtually eliminates the need for costly state veri￿cation. Standard CAT
insurance, by contrast, are typically based on actual losses and cover pre-speci￿ed layers, de￿ned by a deductible or ￿retention￿
(below which no loss is covered) and a ￿limit￿above which no loss is covered.
15Such assumption does not alter the qualitative results of our analysis (insurance always reduces the likelihood of default)
but limit the number of cases that we have to analyze.
6not binding). Moreover, because ￿ > 1, the e⁄ective cost of insurance exceeds that of international capital,
and no insurance is purchased. The solution is then identical to benchmark case.
For lower values of x (xB
1 > x ￿ xI
2) the borrowing constraint limits period 1 borrowing. As in the
benchmark case, for rare events the country always chooses to maximize period 0 investment (which in this
case attains the optimal D0 = 1), so that period 1 is the residual variable. In this regard, insurance plays a
complementary role: by ensuring the availability of resources in the aftermath of a shock, it increases output
in bad states and, through this channel, relaxes the borrowing constraint (4) that becomes:















This implies that insurance has a ￿catalytic￿e⁄ect on private lending: by purchasing insurance the country
enhances access to the international capital market in bad states. This e⁄ect explains why the country
might be willing to purchase insurance even if it is expensive relative to capital markets. More precisely, the










where the expensive premium (the ￿rst RHS term) is counterbalanced by the positive catalytic e⁄ect (the
second RHS term). On the other hand, given its costly nature, the country would purchase insurance only
as a complement to market funds, so that
Z ￿ ￿ ￿ Dnd
1 ; (19)
since increasing coverage beyond Z would simply substitute expensive insurance for less costly debt. In
this way, insurance ￿lls in for private markets, both crowding in additional private funds and providing the
resources that the market does not o⁄er to allow the country to insure against the shock.
For lower income countries (x < xI
2), insurance will no longer have a catalytic e⁄ect, as the country
cannot borrow in period 1: However, the country may still be interested in buying insurance. Why? To relax
its borrowing constraint in period 0, which now becomes
(D0 + ￿￿Z) ￿ ￿(x + ￿minfD0;(1 ￿ ￿) + Zg); (20)
from which we have that:
D0 ￿ Dnd
0 ￿ ￿ (x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) + (￿￿ ￿ ￿￿)Z: (21)




@Z > 0 and
@E(Y )
@Z > 0. In other words, since insurance
increases access to capital market in period 0, the country fully insures, that is, purchases insurance for an
7amount Z = Dnd
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) so as to bring infrastructure to L = K in the event of a shock.
It is important to note that it is never in the best interest of the country to overborrow at the risk of
defaulting in bad states and purchasing insurance. The intuition is the following. Consider a country that
overborrows and defaults in bad states; the anticipation of default eliminates the catalytic e⁄ect of insurance
(through its role in the now irrelevant (4)). In turn, without this e⁄ect, insurance is simply too expensive
and no insurance would be purchased if default in bad states is inevitable. Note that insurance does not
work as a substitute for lending. Rather, it pays o⁄ to insure only if the country reaps the crowding-in
bene￿ts, for which insurance funds need to work as collateral to prevent default in bad states. If default in
bad states is anticipated, the collateral value of insurance vanishes.
Finally for poor countries (xI
3 > x), access to insurance no longer plays a role as the catalytic e⁄ect
disappears because the lack of creditworthiness limits investment opportunity in period 0.
The previous analysis is summarized in Figure 1.b, where we plot debt and insurance outlays under
the insurance case for the same parameter as in Figure 1.a. In addition, we assume that the overhead
parameter ￿ = 1:3.
As we already pointed out, for high income countries the borrowing constraint does not bind, no insurance
is purchased, and the results are the same as in the benchmark case. Less rich countries (xB
1 > x ￿ xI
2),
instead, start purchasing insurance to increase their ability to rebuild infrastructure in the aftermath of the
shock. Notice that in this case insurance plays two roles. On the one hand, by ensuring the availability of
￿pre￿nanced￿reconstruction funds, it increases output in bad states and, in turn, default costs, crowding
in private lenders. As a result, in this region, insurance enlarges the amount of resources available in the
aftermath of the shock relative to the benchmark, and complements private funds. Also, the more credit
constrained a country is, the more insurance it buys. Relatively poorer countries (x < xI
2), instead, are less
a⁄ected by the shock (because of their limited capital investment in period 0)), and this negatively a⁄ects
their demand for insurance.
4 A catastrophe lending facility
The previous analysis focused on the ￿supply side￿of the problem showing that the availability of insurances
allows a country to relax the borrowing constraint￿ albeit at or despite a considerable cost. However, because
large events of a systemic nature such as natural disasters involve massive economic losses and a⁄ect a large
number of people, they typically trigger ex-post government intervention which agents correctly anticipate.
This often creates Samaritan dilemma type of problems that lead individuals to underinvest in catastrophe
insurance. Similarly, at the international level, catastrophes in low-income countries elicit an almost immedi-
ate reaction by the international community in the form of (often concessional) loans for social expenditure
and reconstruction. Why would a country bear the exorbitant insurance premiums if it is likely to have
access to o¢ cial resources at a small cost? Is this version of the Samaritan￿ s dilemma what is behind the
scarcity of catastrophe insurance in middle- and low￿ income countries? Would it be there any demand for
insurance should the latter be made available to all?
We can easily adapt our model to look into this issue and examine whether insurance is still purchased
by the country in presence of a catastrophe lending facility o⁄ering unlimited funds at the risk-free rate in
the event a shock. For expositional purposes, it is easier to tackle this question in two steps, solving ￿rst for
8the lending facility in the absence of insurance, and then introducing the insurance.
Consider now the case in which a multilateral lender o⁄ers a catastrophe lending facility, as in the case of
the recent approved World Bank CAT DDO facility,16 from which a country can draw (only) in the event of
a shock. It is easy to show that this facility cannot be o⁄ered by private markets because loan amounts will
be restricted by the borrowing constraint in exactly the same way D1 was in the previous case. However, a
multilateral lender could in principle exploit its preferred creditor status to provide access in period 1 beyond
what the borrowing constraint allows. Indeed, preferred o¢ cial creditors (the government at the national
level, multilaterals and donors at the international level) are the ones that usually come to the rescue after
large natural disasters.
In order to represent the preferred creditor status of the multilateral lender, we assume that defaulting
on the multilateral is prohibitively costly so that multilateral loans are always repaid. Therefore, in this
case, selective default on private creditors could be an equilibrium outcome.17
Given the debt D0 (with private lenders) and M (with o¢ cial lenders), in period 2 the country faces two
choices: repay or default on bonds.
More formally, in period 2; the sovereign does not default on bonds if, and only if
D0 ￿ Dnd
0 (M) = ￿ [x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + D1 + M)] ￿ D1 ￿ ￿M; (22)
whereas the unconstrained M is set to maximize period 2 output, i.e., M = D0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿).
Replacing M into (22), we obtain
D0 ￿ Dnd
0 =
￿ (x + 1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
: (23)
Note that the fact that M is chosen ex post (i.e., the country cannot commit not to borrow from the
facility in period 1) simpli￿es the problem, which now boils down to the choice of period 0 borrowing, D0.
Also note that, under the assumption that multilateral and private lending command the same interest rate,
the actual composition of period 1 lending is immaterial for the current analysis. Then, without loss of
generality, we can set D1 = 0.
In the non default case, expected income can be expressed as




0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
: (24)
However, the country can also borrow beyond the limit imposed by (23) and, after a shock, withdraw from
the facility and default on the bond. In this case, expected income is given by
E(Y ) = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
x + (￿ ￿ 1)Dd
0
￿
+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) (25)
As before, the equilibrium can be characterized by income levels. In the case of rich countries (x > xB
1 )
16The CAT DDO is a new ￿nancial product o⁄ered to middle-income country governments by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), part of the World Bank Group.
17We implicitly assume that the multilateral has no way of conditioning its lending on the continued service of the debt with
private lenders, which in our setup simply re￿ects a sequencing issue: the fact that the contingent loan is disbursed in period
1, before the bond matures. However, we come back to this point in the ￿nal section.
9the borrowing constraint is not binding: the country borrows and invests Dnd
0 = 1 in period 0, and D1 = ￿,
in period 1 in the event of a shock. However now, less rich countries x 2 [xM
1 ;xB
1 ], can borrow from the
facility as much as they need because defaulting on it is not an option.
In the case of poorer countries, (x 2 [xM
2 ;xM
1 ]), period 0 borrowing constraint binds: Dnd
0 < 1 and, as a
result, M = Dnd
0 ￿(1￿￿) < ￿. For lower level of endowments (x 2 [xI
3;xM
3 ]) the credit constrained country






in period 0 at a risk-adjusted rate i = 1
1￿￿, and, if hit by the
shock, borrows Md = Dd
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) from the contingent credit line in period 1, and defaults in period 2
on its obligation to private creditors. The intuition is similar to that in the benchmark case, except that
now the overborrowing country still has access to ￿nancial resources in period 1. Indeed, overborrowing also
increases output in bad states, since reconstruction funds are not restricted by the borrowing constraint and
increase linearly with period 0 investment. For this reason, default has a smaller impact on income than in
the benchmark. Finally, for the same reason as before, low income countries (x 2 [xI
3;xM
3 ]) choose to avoid
default and borrow from the facility as long as they face capital needs in period 1
A visual comparison of how the multilateral facility (see Figure 1.c) compares with the benchmark case
reveals that the presence of the contingent credit line narrows the interval in which the country chooses to
default. This is so because the contingent credit line increases the value at stake in case of a default. Given
that default costs in this setup are proportional to output, the benign output e⁄ect of the contingent line
increases the cost of defaults and reduces their incidence￿ even though the defaulting country still has access
to the multilateral loan.
In turn, comparing with the insurance case, borrowing in period 0 is never higher under the lending
facility. Again, the intuition is relatively straightforward: whereas the insurance premium entails a transfer
from good to bad states (and, in particular, is arbitrarily small for rare events), the catastrophe loan transfers
the cost of the shock intertemporally within bad states (that is, states marked by the occurrence of the shock),
creating a sharp asymmetry between good and bad states, and tightening the borrowing constraint associated
with the latter. Hence, the lower borrowing amounts (due to the crowding out of period 0 bond borrowing
by period 1 multilateral lending) and the positive probability of default.
Regarding this point, note that for simplicity we assumed that the lending facility extended one-period
loans. While this realistically re￿ ect the short-run nature of most emergency and concessional lending,
it bears the question of whether a longer loan can substitute insurance in those cases in which, because of
market imperfections or political economy reasons, supply or demand for insurance is likely to be insu¢ cient.
More speci￿cally, can a 1 in 30 years event be covered indistinctly by insurance and by a 30-year contingent
loan?
According to the previous analysis, it cannot. A country that optimally borrows from the facility after
it is hit by a shock inherits the full stock of debt, irrespective of the duration of the loan. In other words,
since default in this case is not the result of a liquidity crisis but rather the consequence of a cost-bene￿t
analysis, it is the stock of debt rather than its ￿ ow cost that determines the decision.
Consider now the case in which the country has access to both insurance and the lending facility. Would
the country still purchase insurance in this case, or would it rely entirely on catastrophe lending? In other
words, does the facility make the supply of insurance redundant for the country?
To answer the question, ￿rst note that for relatively rich countries (x 2 [xM
1 ;xB
1 ]), borrowing from the
facility is clearly superior to insurance, because it allows the country to circumvent the borrowing constraint
10at a lower cost. On the other hand, it is easy to verify that, for x < xM
1 , insurance is always demanded.
In particular, for x 2 [xI
2;xM
1 ], see Figure 3a, the country￿ s problem consists in investing L0 = 1, and
L1 = ￿, at the lowest cost, which in turn implies minimizing the amount of (costly) insurance compatible
with that objective. The borrowing constraint (4) now becomes:
(D0 + ￿￿Z) ￿ ￿(x + ￿((1 ￿ ￿) + Z + M)) ￿ ￿M; (26)
and substituting
M = D0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Z (27)
(26) can be rewritten as:
D0 ￿
(x + 1 ￿ ￿ + Z)￿ ￿ ￿￿Z
1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
: (28)
It is easy to verify that within this interval, both insurance and multilateral lending coexist. In addition,
for x ￿ xI
2, low period 0 investment levels make the lending facility redundant, and insurance becomes the
only source of funding in bad states. Thus, we are back to the insurance case discussed previously.
In summary, the demand for insurance is crowded out by the presence of the facility only for those
relatively high income countries for which the facility is enough to lift the borrowing constraint. However,
because multilateral lending crowds out access to capital markets in period 0, insurance still plays a helpful
role reducing the burden of period 1 debt, thereby relaxing the borrowing constraint. In other words, while
the Samaritan￿ s dilemma considerations eliminate the need for insurance as a source of funds in bad states,
it does not eliminate its catalytic role in good states.
5 Welfare analysis
So far, we have concentrated on the implications of the models in terms of access to ￿nance in both states.
Naturally, there is more to this exercise than simply comparing access. Indeed, an evaluation of the di⁄erent
alternatives would have to ponder their consequences in terms of expected income which, without great loss
of generality, we perform graphically for the set of parameters used in the ￿gures. Our welfare analysis is
summarized in Figure 2. The top panel (2a) of the ￿gure plots net income from production in good and
bad states (that is, output net of borrowing costs and endowments, or Yg;b ￿ x), for each of the three main
scenarios under study: the benchmark, up-front insurance and ex-post catastrophe lending. The second
panel (2b) does the same for expected income. Not surprisingly, both insurance and catastrophe lending are
(weakly) superior to the benchmark: income under each alternative (and in both states) is always greater or
equal than in their absence. But their relative bene￿ts di⁄er according to the country￿ s endowment.
If access to ￿nance is not critical (richer countries), the insurance option yields a lower expected income
than the less expensive multilateral lending facility. However, in the case of low-middle income countries the
multilateral facility may, at the same time, crowd out private lending and be ine⁄ective in avoiding costly
default. Since for these countries access to ￿nance is critical it is not surprising that higher levels of expected
income are associated with the insurance option. What is somehow more surprising is that for a large set
of endowment values a country may enjoys higher income in both states of nature if it relies on insurance
rather than on the multilateral facility.
11Such welfare trade-o⁄s are clearly illustrated in Figure 3, where we cast a closer look at the situation
in which insurance and the catastrophe lending coexist. As can be seen, the demand for insurance kicks
in at the endowment level for which the borrowing constraint starts limiting investment in period 0. Thus,
by crowding in private lending in period 0, insurance enables a ￿nancially constrained country to reach the
optimal level of investment, albeit at a premium that detracts from the optimal expected income.
A potentially undesirable characteristic of the lending facility examined above is that it involves a mul-
tilateral institution lending to a country at a time when the country is expected to default on its private
creditors. Unlike implicit arrangements, an explicit facility could still condition access to the facility ex ante,
so as to make sure that the borrower has the incentives to avoid default.18 This is not far from standard
multilateral practice: multilateral loans are often granted provided that the recipient country meets certain
debt sustainability criteria.19 In this way, the o¢ cial lender ensures that the country does not take the new
money the minute before it defaults on third parties. Intuitively, to the extent that overborrowing excludes
the country from the facility, this new condition should detract from the incentives to default, and reduce
its incidence.
The solution for a contingent catastrophe lending facility (contingent on not defaulting on the private
sector) does not di⁄er much from the one presented in the previous section (see Appendix). Interestingly,
a comparison between the contingent and the uncontingent facility reveals the latter to be better, at least
in terms of expected income, see Figure 4. The reasons is that, for those endowment levels for which the
two di⁄er, the contingent facility saves the default costs at the expense of leaving the country under￿nanced
after an adverse shock. However, because the shock is exogenous, the situation involves no moral hazard
and no value is created by reducing the incidence of default. On the contrary, the punishment (exclusion
from the facility) translates in a lower overall welfare.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed how countries with di⁄erent degree of access to credit markets can cope
with natural disasters. More precisely, we have shown that insurance, even when very expensive, can be
an e⁄ective instrument to improve a country￿ s creditworthiness. We have also shown that the presence of
a credit line that provides automatic access to reconstruction funds ex-post, at a cheaper cost, does not
completely crowd out the demand for insurance.
The previous discussion, however, needs to be quali￿ed in three ways. First, the insurance and the credit
line di⁄er in one crucial aspect: the loan has to be paid after a bad shock while the cost of insurance is
transferred to good states. In other words, income (and consumption) volatility is bound to be lower with
insurance than in any other scenario. Trivially, if income smoothing￿ from which we deliberately abstracted
so far￿ were a policy objective, insurance would become relatively more appealing, a result that would only
add to the case for insurance that our ￿ndings support.
Second, we assumed that the ex-post credit line is not concessional and that the lender recoups the cost.
In reality, often disaster help is highly concessional. Our main results would hold true for a limited level of
18To enhance incentives without distorting its automatic nature, the facility could involve temporary subscriptions on a rolling
basis, to ensure that the country is not cut o⁄ overnight but still faces frequent exams.
19However, in the aftermath of a natural catastrophe it is not unlikely that other creditors (especially bilateral) agree to
write-o⁄ part of their credit to allow multilateral lending.
12concessionality. Of course, if the country expects pure grants, these will completely crowd out the demand
for insurance.
Finally, while insurance (particularly when reasonably priced) would seem the logical option for disaster-
prone middle-income countries, the fact that it entails a payment up front in exchange for an infrequent
positive transfer makes this type of arrangement a political hard sell. Thus, from a policy perspective, a
multilateral catastrophe lending facility may be the only feasible alternative even for those cases in which
insurance is a possible choice. Such political economy considerations should be carefully analyzed and this
could be the focus of future research.
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147 APPENDIX
7.1 The benchmark case




Setting D0 = 1, and D1 = ￿, it is immediate to verify that (4) becomes
1 + ￿ ￿ ￿(x + ￿);
and is satis￿ed if x ￿ xB
1 .
In turn, K = D0 = 1, L = D1 = ￿ yield
End
1B(Y ) = x + ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿￿):
7.1.2 Case 2B: xB




If x < xB
1 , the country cannot borrow D0 = 1 in period 0 and still have access to D1 = ￿ in bad states.
Therefore, it faces a trade-o⁄between maximizing period 0 investment, or ￿underinvesting￿initially in order
to ￿save￿additional access in bad times.
Note that in equilibrium L ￿ K =) 1 ￿ ￿ + D1 ￿ D0 so that the relevant borrowing constraint (4) can
be written as:




￿x + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ D0
1 ￿ ￿￿
:
In turn, we can express the trade-o⁄ between increasing consumption in good and bad states in terms of




1 )] = x + ￿((1 ￿ ￿)D0 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ D0 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)Dnd
1
subject to 0 ￿ Dnd
1 ￿ D0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
It is then easy to verify that, for ￿ low enough,
@E(Y )
@D0




which indicates that the country maximizes period 1 investment (D0 = 1) at the expense of lower investment
in the event of an adverse shock.
Finally, we need to verify that the country can invest a positive amount in the second period while






￿x ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))
1 ￿ ￿￿
￿ 0 () x ￿ xB
2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
: (30)
15In sum, for x 2 [x1;x2], we have that K2B = D0 = 1, and, L2B = D1 =
￿x￿(1￿￿￿(1￿￿))
1￿￿￿ < ￿, and
End
2B(Y ) = x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿D1(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1:
7.1.3 Case 3B: xB
2 > x ￿ xB
3 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿1
￿(￿￿1)(1￿￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
It follows from (30) that, in this interval, D1 = 0. Moreover, the country cannot borrow the optimal amount
of capital in period 0 without risking default if hit by a shock.
From (10) and (12),
Dnd












0 = 1 () x > e x ￿








so that for a su¢ ciently small ￿, there exists a non-empty interval [e x;x2] such that Dd
0 = 1. We also have
that
Dnd
0 > (1 ￿ ￿) () x >




e xa < e x () ￿ < 1 ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
so that in the interval [e x;x2], minfDd
0;Dnd
0 g > 1 ￿ ￿ so that the countries have an interest in borrowing if
they are hit by the shock.
Finally, we have that:
EndY ((Dnd
0 )) = (1 ￿ ￿)(x + ￿Dnd
0 ) + ￿ [x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ Dnd
0 ; (34)
Ed(Y (Dd
0)) = (1 ￿ ￿)(x + ￿Dd
0) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ Dd
0; (35)
substituting the values for Dd
0 and Dnd

















= 1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ x ￿ ￿);
which is linear in x.
Trivially, for x = xB
2 , we have that Dd
0 = Dnd























= ￿(￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿(￿ ￿ 1));
expression that is negative if ￿ is small enough. From this, it follows that within the interval there is
a unique value of x3 2 [e x;xB
2 ] such that E(Y (Dnd
0 )) ￿ E(Y (Dd
0)) > 0 , x > xB








￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿, so that in the interval [x3;x2] the country chooses to borrow
K3B = Dnd
0 = ￿ (x + (1 ￿ ￿)￿) and default is avoided. Income is then given by
End





+ ￿(x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)g ￿ Dnd
0 : (36)
7.1.4 Case 4B: xB
3 > x ￿ xB
4 ￿
(￿￿1)(1￿(1￿￿)￿￿)
(1￿￿)(￿￿1)￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
From the previous proof, it follows that for e x ￿ x ￿ xB
3 , E(Y (Dd
0)) ￿ E(Y (Dnd
0 )) > 0, and K0 = Dd
0 = 1.




1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿x < 1;
First of all let￿ s verify that in this interval minfDd
0;Dnd
0 g > 1 ￿ ￿. Indeed, we have:
xd
a ￿ fx : Dd







0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) if x > xd
a;
xnd
a ￿ fx : Dnd
0 = (1 ￿ ￿)g =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
; and Dnd
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) if x > xnd
a ;

















￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿)
> 0 () ￿ < 1 ￿
1
￿￿
which is always veri￿ed for ￿ small enough. We can now substitute the values value into Dd
0, and Dnd
0 in








(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))(￿ ￿ 1)) + ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ ￿ 1)￿ + x(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿ 0
() x ￿ xB
4 ￿
(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)￿ ￿ ￿
:













in period 0, and defaults if hit by a shock in period 1. In this case, income is given by
17E4B(Y ) = (1 ￿ ￿)(x + ￿Dd
0) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ Dd
0:
7.1.5 Case 5B: xB
4 > x ￿ 0
Finally, it is easy to check that for x < xB
4 ; K5B
0 = Dnd
0 = ￿(x+￿(1￿￿)) and the country does not default.
In this case, expected income is given by, in case 3B, by





+ ￿(x + ￿minf(1 ￿ ￿);Dnd
0 g ￿ Dnd
0 :
7.2 Insurance
7.2.1 Case 1I (x > xB
1 )
In the case of rich countries (x ￿ xB
1 )no Insurance is needed to attain the optimum (the borrowing constraint
is not binding). Moreover, because ￿ > 1, the e⁄ective cost of insurance exceeds that of international capital,
and no insurance is purchased.
7.2.2 Case 2I (xB




As in case 2B, the borrowing constraint determines period 1 borrowing. However, unlike in the benchmark,
insurance plays a complementary role by increasing the collateral and relaxing the constraint. Speci￿cally,
we can write the country￿ s problem at time 0 in terms of D0, D1 and Z as:
max
D0;Z;D1
End [Y (D0;Z;D1)] = x + ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1)D0 + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)D1 ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)Z (37)
subject to the borrowing constraint














Substituting (39) into (37), we have that, for any given Z, and for small ￿,
￿ <
(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿￿)








18which implies that the country maximizes period 0 investment and tells us, in particular, that Dnd
1 > 0 =)
D0 = 1.
Consider the case in which endowment x is large enough to allow the country to borrow D0 = 1.










where the positive sign comes from (13), so that the country purchases insurance subject to
Z ￿ Znd ￿ ￿ ￿ Dnd
1 : (41)

















1 + ￿ ￿ ￿ (x + ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿ 0 () x ￿










, D0 = 1, Dnd
1 > 0 and Znd > 0.
7.2.3 Case 3I (xIN




If x < xIN
2 , the country fully exhausts its access to capital in period 0, so the ￿catalytic￿e⁄ect of insurance is
re￿ ected directly in the borrowing constraint determining access in period 0. Speci￿cally, insurance increases
income in period 1 (the value at stake in bad states), at a cost proportional to the likelihood of the insured
event, relaxing the borrowing constraint that now becomes
(D0 + ￿￿Z) ￿ ￿(x + ￿minfD0;(1 ￿ ￿) + Zg);
or
D0 ￿ Dnd
0 ￿ ￿ [x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] + (￿￿ ￿ ￿￿)Z: (42)
Substituting Dnd








= x + ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1)Dnd








which is trivially veri￿ed for a small enough ￿.
19This in turn implies that the country always purchase insurance subject to
Z ￿ Znd = D0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿);
where Znd denotes the point at which insurance funds allow the country to rebuild infrastructure to the level
L = K.
Finally, substituting Znd in (42) we have that
Znd ￿ 0 () Dnd
0 =
x￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) () x ￿ xIN
3 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
In this interval the country has the option to borrow Dd
0, such that 1 ￿ Dd
0 > Dnd
0 , at a risk-adjusted
rate, and default in bad states. If so, the borrowing constraint (5) becomes:
1
1 ￿ ￿





(1 ￿ ￿)￿x ￿ ￿￿Z
















0 + ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ [￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]Z)]:











= ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿] ￿ ￿￿
[￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1]
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿




From (13) and (6), we know that ￿ > ￿ > 1
(1￿￿), so both conditions hold.
Then, substituting Z = 0 into (45),
Dd
0 = 1 () x ￿ e x ￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿










￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿
>
￿x
1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿
;



























Therefore, to show that the country never chooses the default option, it su¢ ces to show that it is so for
x = e x, the point at which the additional borrowing in period 0 relative to the non-default case is maximized.
Finally,
Dd
0 (x = e x) = 1 > Dnd
0 =
￿e x + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿







which is never veri￿ed for small ￿, since ￿ < 1
￿
7.2.4 Case 4I (xIN
3 > x ￿ 0)
If x < xIN
3 , the country does not purchase insurance and we are back in the benchmark case. To ensure that




￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
> 0
which is always the case for su¢ ciently small values of ￿.
7.3 Catastrophe lending facility
As before, for high initial incomes (x ￿ xM
1 =
1￿￿(￿￿￿)
￿ ), the borrowing constraint (22) does not bind and
the country invests the optimum in both states. In turn, for x < xM
1 , from (23)
Dnd
0 =
￿ (x + 1 ￿ ￿)




0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) =
￿x ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
> 0 () x > xM
4 ￿




Alternatively, a ￿nancially constrained country may choose to increase borrowing from private lenders
(at a risk-adjusted rate i = 1
1￿￿) at the expense of defaulting on bonds if hit by a shock. However, unlike in
the benchmark, now the country would still have access to multilateral lending in period 2. In this scenario,
period 0 borrowing Dd
0 should be such that the country repays in good states:
Dd






1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿ 1 () x ￿ e xM
2 ￿





1 for small ￿, and
Md = Dd
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿x
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0
() x ￿ e xM














0;Md) ￿ E(Y (Dnd;Mnd) > 0





+ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + Md) ￿ Md￿
￿ Dd
0 (48)







x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + Mnd) ￿ Mnd￿
￿ Dnd
0










(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿ [x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)Md ￿ Mnd￿￿
: (49)


































1￿(1￿￿)￿￿ < 1 ￿ ￿ < Dnd
0 =
￿[x+1￿￿]
1￿￿(￿￿1), and Mnd > Md = 0, and no default
occurs
Given the linearity of (49), to characterize the equilibrium it su¢ ces to check the thresholds for the ￿rst
two intervals.
Trivially, for x = xM
1 , (49) does not hold and no default occurs, since Dd
0 = Dnd
0 = 1. In turn, for
x = e xM
2 , Dd
0 = 1 > Dnd












+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿







and, again, the country does not default.






, such that xM
1 > xM
2 > e xM
2 > xM
3 > e xM
3 > xM
4 , within






in period 0, and, if hit by the shock, borrows Md =
Dd
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) from the contingent loan credit and defaults.
The thresholds for the default interval are obtained directly from (49) as:
xM





(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿

















￿2 (1 + ￿2 (￿ ￿ 1)) + ￿ (￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿ (￿2 (￿ ￿ 1) + ￿)
:
7.4 Catastrophe lending and insurance
For x 2 [xM
1 ;xIN
2 ], the country minimizes the amount of (costly) insurance such that it still attains L0 = 1,
and L1 = ￿. The borrowing constraint (4) then becomes:
(D0 + ￿￿Z) ￿ ￿(x + ￿((1 ￿ ￿) + Z + M)) ￿ ￿M; (51)
which, substituting,
M = D0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Z
yields
D0 ￿
(x + 1 ￿ ￿ + Z)￿ ￿ ￿￿Z
1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ e DMIN
0 (52)
Finally, we have that
e DMIN
0 ￿ 1 () Z ￿ e ZMIN ￿
1 ￿ ￿(x ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿￿
;
and, in addition, for M to be non negative, we need
Z ￿ ￿:
The two conditions are simultaneously veri￿ed for
x ￿




Consider now the case x ￿ xIN
2 . We can now substitute D0 from (51) in the expression for expected
income, so that





+ ￿(x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + M + Z) ￿ M) ￿ Dbl
0 ￿ ￿￿Z:




(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿)￿ ￿ ￿(1 + ￿￿ + ￿￿2)
1 ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
;
which is always positive for small enough ￿. Thus for x ￿ xIN
2 we are back to the insurance case.
7.5 A contingent catastrophe lending facility
The model can be readily modi￿ed to represent this case: we simply need to note that no multilateral
assistance is forthcoming in the event of default (Md = 0), which tilts the balance against the default
decision: default, while still possible, is associated with narrower interval.










(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿ [x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] + (￿ ￿ 1)Mnd￿
:










(1 ￿ ￿￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))







= 1 ￿ Dnd
0 ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿ [x + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] + (￿ ￿ 1)Mnd￿
> 0
for small ￿. On the other hand, for x = e xM
3 , Md = 0 and we are back in the previous case, where from (50)
we know that the country chooses to borrow less and avoid default.
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period 0, and, if hit by the shock, defaults.
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Figure 1c: Multilateral Lending





























Fig. 2b: Expected+Net/ Income +Red B, Green I, Blue M/
























Fig. 3b: Expected  +Net/ Income +Red B, Green IN, Orange MI/














Fig.4: Exp. +Net/ Income +Blue  Mult.Facil., Yellow  Mult. Cont. Facil./
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E(Y)-x